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Abstract
Federal housing recovery policy bounds many of the decisions made by households after a disaster. Within this policy
domain, home buyout programs are increasingly used to encourage residents to permanently relocate out of areas consid-
ered at risk for future hazards. While buyouts offer homeowners and governments potential benefits, research exploring
the impacts of these policies is limited. In this paper, we present an in-depth examination of the community experience
of buyouts, a perspective that is noticeably lacking in the literature. Using data from two mixed-method empirical studies,
we explored the implications of buyout program design and implementation for Oakwood Beach, New York, a commu-
nity offered a buyout after Hurricane Sandy. We found that design decisions made at program conception significantly
impacted participants’ experience of the buyout, including their understanding of program goals and their progression
through the buyout and relocation process. We conclude with recommendations for future buyouts, including increased
inclusion of affected communities in the process of and pre-event planning for recovery, along with recommendations for
future research.
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1. Introduction
Home buyout programs facilitate the permanent reloca-
tion of residents out of areas considered at risk for fu-
ture disasters. In their most basic form, buyout programs
give homeowners the opportunity to sell their homes to
a local implementing agency and relocate, ideally to a
less hazardous area. While these programs are federally
funded, they are implemented by municipal, county, or
state agencies, and the land purchased through buyouts
is converted into open space in perpetuity. In theory,
then, home buyouts mitigate against future hazards by
reducing the number of households at risk and increas-
ing the amount of natural mitigation in place. These pro-
grams have been in use in the U.S. since the late 1970s,
beginningwith the relocation of flooded homes and busi-
nesses in Soldiers Grove,WI (David &Mayer, 1984; Tobin
& Peacock, 1982).
Several states and communities have implemented
buyouts in the intervening years, though our understand-
ing of how these programs impact households and com-
munities remains limited. This is due, in part, to a dearth
of empirical research and limited evaluations of past
programs. While few studies have examined the risks
of buyout programs specifically, previous studies have
found displacement to be associated with a range of so-
cial costs including losses in homeownership, social net-
works, access to healthcare, employment, income, and
physical and mental health (Blaze & Shwalb, 2009; Hori
& Schafer, 2009; Mortensen, Wilson, & Ho, 2009; Riad &
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Norris, 1996; Sanders, Bowie, & Bowie, 2003; Weber &
Peek, 2012). These risks may be exacerbated for individ-
uals and households who relocate permanently as com-
pared to temporarily (Badri, Asgary, Eftekhari, & Levy,
2006; Blaze & Shwalb, 2009; Milne, 1977; Yzermans et
al., 2005), for those who relocate outside their original
community (Hori & Schafer, 2009; Kessler et al., 2008),
and for those who experience ecological stress (e.g. food
shortages, overcrowding) while displaced and in the relo-
cation process (Riad & Norris, 1996). Given the potential
risks associated with relocation, then, we would argue
that a primary goal of any buyout effort, beyond reduc-
ing hazard exposure, should be to minimize these risks
for participating households.
Further, given their substantive history and on-going
use in the U.S., buyouts should show evidence of im-
provement over time. In a previous study (Greer&Binder,
2016), we used policy learning theory to explore the ex-
tent to which these policies and programs had iterated
over time. We examined eight buyout programs imple-
mented between 1978 and 2005, and compared them
according to key design features including primary fund-
ing source(s), number of homes purchased, duration, cri-
teria for inclusion, use of financial incentives and disin-
centives, and degree of government involvement. We
found little evidence of policy learning across buyout pro-
grams. Rather, the programs were designed and imple-
mented independently with limited influence from past
programs, with minimal guidance from federal funding
agencies, and by local implementing agencies that lacked
experience purchasing hazard-prone properties.
In this paper we contribute to the nascent literature
on home buyout policy by applying case study methodol-
ogy to examine howprogramdesign affects household ex-
perience, a question on which the overall success of buy-
outs hinges. We use the framework presented in our pre-
vious study of policy learning in buyouts as a starting point
for understanding these processes. We begin by detailing
a home buyout program implemented in New York after
Hurricane Sandy, providing an overview of how Sandy af-
fected the area and the relevant features of the buyout
program. Next, we describe our methodology for explor-
ing New York’s buyout based on our framework. Then,
we present data on how selection criteria, financial incen-
tives, government involvement, the buyout program pro-
gression, and the perceived voluntariness of the program
all influenced lived experiences for participating house-
holds. We conclude by discussing study implications and
by offering recommendations for moving forward.
2. Background
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall
in southern New Jersey, resulting in 159 fatalities and
$50 billion dollars in damages in the U.S. (Hurricane
Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 2013). Sandy was primar-
ily a storm surge event, making it a monumental housing
disaster that damaged or destroyed 650,000 homes and
displaced residents for many months. In response, New
York developed a home buyout program to transform
portions of the state’s coastal flood zones into preserva-
tion land (Kaplan, 2013; New York State Homes and Com-
munity Renewal [NYHCR], 2013). In its original form, the
buyout plan offered 100% of a home’s pre-storm value
for substantially damaged homes (damaged beyond 50%
of their value) located in the highest risk coastal areas
(known as “V Zones” on the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency [FEMA] flood maps) and to substantially
damaged homes located within the 500-year floodplain
(NYHCR, 2013). The buyout program was later adjusted
to apply only to homes within the V Zones, while sub-
stantially damagedhomeswithin the 500-year floodplain
were eligible for a separate acquisition program1 (Gover-
nor’s Office of Storm Recovery [GOSR], 2014). While a
large number of homes were technically eligible for the
buyout, the state ultimately selected only ten communi-
ties for buyouts, including three in New York City (NY Ris-
ing, 2014).
Homeowners in the eligible communities who opted
to enroll in the buyout program had their homes ap-
praised by a private company contracted by the state
and received an offer based on that appraisal. To en-
courage participation in the selected communities, the
state offered financial incentives in areas it designated
as “enhanced buyout zones”, defined as “areas at highest
risk in the floodplains that are determined to be among
the most susceptible to future disasters” (GOSR, 2014, p.
10). Homeowners could then accept the appraised value
or hire a private appraiser (at their own expense) and
appeal the offer. For those who accepted a buyout of-
fer, a closing date was set and the property transferred
to the state. Homeowners were responsible for finding
and relocating to a new home once the property trans-
fer was complete. In keeping with the requirements of
theU.S. Department of Housing andUrbanDevelopment
(HUD), which funded the buyout, the state was responsi-
ble for demolishing the purchased homes and convert-
ing the property to open space. As of July 2015, the state
had purchased 713 homes through the buyout program
(GOSR, personal communication, July 7, 2015).
3. Methods
In this paper, we present a case study of Oakwood
Beach, a coastal community in New York City where
most residents opted to participate in the state’s buy-
out program. Yin (2013) suggests that case studies are
appropriate when asking “how” or “why” questions, us-
ing multiple data sources to explore phenomena in a
non-experimental setting. This study focuses specifically
on how programmatic design choices impact household
buyout experiences, and utilizing case study methodol-
ogy allowed us to gather in-depth, experiential data sur-
rounding a single program (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 337).
1 Property acquisitions, while otherwise similar to buyouts, allow the state to resell and redevelop purchased properties.
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Data presented here are drawn from two mixed-
method studies that explored housing recovery and
decision-making in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. We
used three data sources to understand the experiences
of residents: observations, surveys, and in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. We conducted extensive observa-
tions of Oakwood Beach, including attending commu-
nity meetings and home inspections, touring damaged
homes, and spending time with residents in the area.
We conducted two surveys. We collected the first survey
April–August 2013, utilizing a two-step samplingmethod
that included systematic random door-to-door sampling
supplemented by surveys collected at local community
events. The second survey was conducted from May–
July 2014 using a modified version of Dillman’s (1978)
methodology that included mailing a survey to every
household within the buyout zone and homeowners on
adjacent streets. By mailing the survey to participants,
we were able to reach households that were displaced
or no longer living in their pre-Sandy home. Both surveys
included closed-ended questions that explored factors
influencing buyout acceptance and open-ended ques-
tions that probed experiences with and perceptions of
the buyout program. We bound our discussion here to
the more relevant open-ended questions. In total, we re-
ceived open-ended responses from 127 households. To
complement our survey data, we conducted in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with Oakwood Beach resi-
dents. While we were also able to speak with HUD and
local officials about the design and implementation pro-
cess, FEMA, the state of New York, and ProSource Tech-
nologies, a Minnesota-based firm the state of New York
contracted to run the program, denied our numerous in-
terview requests.
We utilized both inductive and deductive coding pro-
cesses to explore the open-ended survey and interview
data. Initially, we used inductive, descriptive coding to
capture the major topics in our data in a word or phrase
(Saldaña, 2012, p. 88). Next, we used deductive, elabo-
rative coding to explore the ways buyout participants ex-
perienced the buyout program, including how the design
of the buyout program influenced their experience, per-
spective, and opinion of the program. Elaborative cod-
ing allows for the use of deductive codes from previous
studies, thereby adding depth to study findings (Saldaña,
2012, p. 229). We built our deductive codes tomirror key
dimensions of buyout programs based on prior work ex-
ploring historical development and variation across buy-
outs (Greer & Binder, 2016).
4. Case Study of New York’s Post-Sandy Home Buyout
Program
In this section we present findings related to the impli-
cations of program design and implementation in a com-
munity context. Focusing on one buyout in one com-
munity, we examine how key elements of buyout de-
sign influence the buyout experience for affected house-
holds. These elements include the criteria for inclusion in
the program, the financial incentives offered, the govern-
ment’s involvement in the buyout process, the progres-
sion of the buyout program, and the perceived voluntari-
ness of the program.Wepresent qualitative data that pro-
vide insight into the experience of residents of Oakwood
Beach related to each of these programmatic elements.
4.1. A Separation of One Street
As was the case with previous buyouts, the criteria for
inclusion in New York’s buyout was initially broadly con-
ceived, inclusive of substantially damaged homes within
the 100- and 500-year floodplains. The geographic fo-
cus of the program shifted and shrank over time, how-
ever, such that the buyout was eventually extended to
only a limited number of purposely-selected communi-
ties. These decisions were contentious. Several commu-
nities within New York City that vocally and actively pur-
sued inclusion in the State’s buyout, for example, were
ultimately excluded from the program (Rizzi, 2014).
Even within Oakwood Beach, which was designated
as the pilot community for the buyout program, deci-
sions about which properties to include were controver-
sial. The initial enhanced buyout zone designation in Oak-
woodBeach included approximately 165 properties in the
coastal Fox Beach neighborhood (Fox Beach 165, 2013).
Over time the buyout zone shifted, though neither the
state nor the city offered residents a clear explanation of
why the line of inclusionwas drawnwhere it was. Dissatis-
fied with the original delineation, some residents whose
properties were located just outside of the buyout zone
organized, gathered signatures, and petitioned to be in-
cluded in the buyout, though most of these efforts were
unsuccessful. Ultimately, the buyout zone included the
original properties in the Fox Beach neighborhood, along
with approximately 115 additional homes in some, but
not all, of the areas immediately adjacent to Fox Beach.
From the community’s perspective this process
seemed arbitrary at best, which was a point of significant
frustration for residents on both sides of the line. Partici-
pants struggled to understand the “haphazard” decisions
related to the inclusion and exclusion of properties, and
described the impacts of these decisions on their families
and community:
“We fell short just 50 ft. from the buyout….The politi-
cians told us we were in Oakwood and not Oakwood
Beach. In the meantime, we receive these surveys we
fill out stating Oakwood Beach. This is the problem
and pitfall unfortunately for my family. My home was
on the market before the hurricane. My child lives
with a life threatening condition. Our home was dif-
ficult to sell at the market. Now on a short sale. We
are on a deficit.
Oh, yeah there was a separation of one street. There
was even a separation on one block where one side
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of the street was a part of the buyout and the other
side of the street was not....So the way it was zoned, I
honestly don’t know.”
4.2. Here’s Rock, Here’s Hard Place, Here’s Us Right in
the Middle
New York used financial incentives to encourage partic-
ipation in the buyout. While these financial incentives
were sizeable relative to past programs, the incentives
were not static. As originally designed, residents in en-
hanced buyout areas were eligible for incentives equal
to a maximum of 25% of the sale price of the home
(GOSR, 2014; Office of Community Renewal, 2013). This
included a 10% incentive for designated high-risk areas,
a 5% incentive if they purchased and relocated to a prop-
erty within the same county (or within New York City, for
city residents), and a 10% incentive for clusters of two to
ten homes where owners of adjacent properties located
within a V Zone collectively agreed to relocate. The 10%
incentive for clusters of homes was later dropped, leav-
ing buyout participants eligible to receive incentives of
up to 15% of the sale price of their home.
Even with this decrease in available incentives, par-
ticipants generally described the incentives as a positive
component of the program. As one resident stated, “the
government’s gonna buy us out, they’re gonna give us
10% above pre-storm, 5% if you stay [on Staten Island].
So financially, with that, we should be okay.” At the same
time, however, the incentive structure was a source of
confusion for participants, few of whom could explain it
clearly. Participants described being provided confusing
and dated information about the amount of incentives
available, and they gave varying, and often misinformed,
explanations of eligibility requirements:
“So, I was originally told that we would get 25%—10,
10, and 5—on top of pre-storm value. Now down the
line, that changed. That became 15%.
And then, because we’re in an enhanced, what’s
called, it’s called an enhanced area? Because we’ve
had problems before? And we’ve had deaths in the
area?...It’s called enhanced.We, if you sell your house
to them, you get an extra 10%. Whatever the amount
is. And if you buy a house, before, like, the complete
closing? Before, you have a certain amount of time.
And you stay on the island, or you stay in the area, you
get another 5%.”
While the incentiveswere seen as helpful, they did not al-
leviate participants’ financial concerns. Oakwood Beach
was a relatively affordable community in the competi-
tive New York City market, which had allowed residents
to purchase homes with yards and other amenities that
would have been beyond their reach in other areas of the
city. After Sandy, finding comparable, affordable hous-
ing elsewhere was a challenge even with the financial
incentives provided through the buyout. Participants de-
scribedhow this, in conjunctionwith other Sandy-related
stressors, left them with few good options:
“Market changed and it was not enough to buy the
same type of house in better neighborhood far from
water. Very stressful was process with mortgage com-
pany: show that you have enough money on your ac-
count, they don’t trust the contract of Buyout Pro-
gram....Eventually I am not happy because of all ex-
tra expenses which appeared because of moving out
and in. My ‘dream’ to pay off the mortgage of former
house before retirement was gone and now my cur-
rent house I will be unable to pay off. On the top of
everythingmymarriage collapsed. It was toomuch for
my husband. P.S. sorry for my English.
Because nowwe can’t go that high on an older house,
‘cause we have to keep money aside, because there’s
no warranties with anything. So, what if we walk in
and twoweeks down the road the boiler decides to go
on the fritz, or, you know, the roof starts to leak. You
know….So, that’s limiting what we can buy now. You
know, here’s rock, here’s hard place, here’s us right in
the middle.”
The dollar amount received from the buyout, in effect,
was not what residents felt was most important. Rather,
whatmatteredwaswhether the buyout enabled them to
replace the home they lost.
4.3. Nobody’s Telling Us Anything
There was relatively little government involvement in
NewYork’s buyout compared to past programs, and prop-
erty transfers closely resembled private sales. It is not
clear why the state opted to follow this model, but
among buyout participants it may have contributed to a
sense that the government was detached from the pro-
cess and unavailable to the community. In their inter-
actions with government agencies and officials, partici-
pants reported receiving conflicting information and be-
ing unable to get answers to questions that directly influ-
enced their housing recovery decisions. One participant
simply stated “That’s the problem. Nobody knows noth-
ing. There’s nowhere to go to get information.”
Participant: “We waited two and a half hours, stood
on line, talked to the FEMA guy? And we had our
friendwith us…so this way, whenwe asked a question,
got an answer, she could help us remember….And we
walked in, and he said, well, who are you. And we
told him who we were. Well who’s this, and we said a
friend of ours. He said well she can stay as long as you
guys don’t ask any questions. Andwewere like….Yeah,
it, it’d be toomuch for him to handle for us to ask ques-
tions. And I’m like, but what am I sittin’ here for two
and a half hours on line for if I can’t ask any questions?
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So he let us ask questions, but basically gave us the
same answers as we had….We waited for two and a
half hours for nothing…”
Interviewer: “What were you hoping to get?”
Participant: “Answers! Howdo you file?Where do you
file? What can you expect to get? You know, what are
we eligible for?”
Issues with information and communication with gover-
ment agencies belied a larger issue of trust in the peo-
ple and agencies directly responsible for administering
the buyout.When askedwhether or to what degree they
trusted the agencies involved in the buyout, responses
weremixed. Some participants were unequivocal in their
belief that the participating agencies would ensure that
the program moved forward as planned, and that they
were acting in the best interests of the residents:
“The governor’s people have made it clear. They’re
moving forward with everyone who wants to move
forward. Who agrees to that buyout. They will be
taken care of swiftly, quickly, and done so we can
move on with our lives.
God gave us this. God gave this to us. The governor
brought this to us. God is watching over us…now as it
stands? You’re getting 15%, you’re getting bought out,
you’re getting fair market value.”
For others, experiences with buyout administrators and
other officials caused them to question whether there
was a sound plan in place for the implementation of the
program and, more to the point, whether the govern-
ment had the residents’ best interests in mind.
“It’s federal, I guess, so, Imean, you should trust the gov-
ernment. But, you know, then again, I just, I don’t know
what they’re planning to do. Is there any actual plan?
I went down there, [the Department of Buildings] had
slapped green sticker onmyhouse that they had came
to my house, on a Sunday, at 3 o’clock in the after-
noon, and did a thorough interior and exterior ex-
amination of my house, and my house was perfectly
sound. I’m like, really!...I said how did you relock my
deadbolts onmy doors when you got out ofmy house,
‘cause there was nobody there for you to let you in.
They never explained that to me. So, we knew at that
point, that they were just slappin’ stickers on houses
for the sake of slappin’ the stickers on houses. So,
right there, we’re all, the whole neighborhood is like,
this is ridiculous, because we can’t trust the people
that are supposed to be helping us.”
These issues were further compounded by competing
goals at the city and state levels. While the State of New
York was pushing for buyouts, New York City developed
a recovery plan that prioritized the redevelopment of
Sandy-damaged properties. As one official stated, the
City was “hoping that people will buy several of these
small lots, and then build a bigger house on them.” For
residents making major decisions about housing, this
added yet another layer of confusion. One participant,
in expressing her exasperation about the process, stated
“[Mayor] Bloomberg is pushing people to rebuild, at the
same time [Governor] Cuomo is pushing the buyout.”
It is worth noting that participants’ expectations for
government agencies during and after the buyout were
shaped by a history of perceived failures by multiple lev-
els of government. Oakwood Beach was established as
a summer beach community, and over time the beach
homeswere converted into year-round residences. There
was a wave of new development beginning in the 1990s
that, as reported by participants, ignored a series of miti-
gation recommendations proposed by the Army Corps of
Engineers. Long-term residents attributed increases in lo-
cal flooding events, including a significant flood in 1992,
to these changes. Sandy amplified these concerns and
raised questions about why the local government, given
their knowledge that the land was vulnerable, had ever
allowed it to be developed as permanent housing:
“Certain areas that, 50, 60, 80 it might be, years ago,
never should have been allowed to be year-round.
Or made year-round. Never should have even been
allowed to be a bungalow area. Never mind homes.
Jumping forward into the 80s and 90s, homes like my
own included! Shouldn’t a been allowed to be built
three stories, shouldn’t a been allowed to be where
they were, so close. I mean, Oakwood Beach, the
ocean’s up here. And, the street and the homes are
down below. You got a sewage plant a half a block
away, that did release.”
4.4. The Waiting Is the Worst Part
Compared to previous buyout efforts (c.f. buyouts asso-
ciated with Hurricane Katrina), the Oakwood Beach Buy-
out launched without delay and did not overstay its wel-
come. Throughout the process, residents were told that
the buyout was moving faster than any buyout had be-
fore, and the goal set by community leaders to have the
first buyout home purchased within a year of the storm
was realized (Sedon, 2013). In retrospect, participants’
generally agreed that the buyout program moved rel-
atively quickly. Participants stated that “the New York
state buyout was clear-cut and expeditious” and that “it
went completely smooth. I think it went fast.”
The speed at which the program began and ended,
however, was not the only factor that shaped how par-
ticipants understood and experienced their progression
through the buyout program. In the interim between the
announcement of the buyout and the actual sale of prop-
erties, participants conveyed the stress and difficulty as-
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sociated with not knowing when, or even if, their homes
would be purchased, a set of experiences that link back
to our previous discussion about trust:
“They don’t understand the anxiety—we’ve lost all
our stuff, we’re trying to fix our homes, but we’re not
getting any information. They want us to live a normal
life. How do you live a normal life?”
Homeowners described the year between Sandy and the
first home purchase as a constant state of waiting: wait-
ing to learn what the state’s offer on their house would
be, waiting for the results of inspections, waiting for help
from FEMAand insurance companies, waiting to see how
high the new flood insurance rateswould be, andwaiting
to see whether the sale of their homes would actually go
through. Each step in this process was uncharted terri-
tory. As one participant stated, “The waiting is the worst
part of the buyout.”
Participant 1: “Well I am a little stressed out.”
Participant 2: “Yeah, she’s washed up.”
Participant 1: “You know what it is, too, you’re up in
the air. You don’t know what you’re gonna do.”
“It could have been faster. Also people were taking
advantage of some of it, too. They had no insurance,
they got paid right away. Us, we’ve been waiting and
waiting and waiting. It doesn’t seem fair. People who
had no insurance got paid right away, people who had
insurance had to wait and fight.”
Housing issues topped many participants’ list of chal-
lenges during this ambiguous period. Residents left with
uninhabitable homes after Sandy struggled to find in-
terim housing. Neither the city nor the state provided
emergency housing,2 leaving affected residents living in
a rented apartment, living with family or friends, or re-
pairing and moving back into their damaged homes:
“Okay, in the interim we were staying, um, first we
were stayin’ at mymother’s, thenmy sister’s, thenmy
brother had us stay in his apartment, and he had to
move out. So we had to pay him rent.
Nobody’s [living in the neighborhood] for 6 months.
We don’t know what’s going on. I gotta tell the truth.
They just came back. That—nothings moving that
quickly, ‘cause they’re telling you they’re gonna buy
you out, and, look at all the work we did [repairing
our house]. You know? We tried. But if they can’t fix
the beach up, you gotta get outta here.
We got our life back in order. Uh, we, as you can see
we fixed up our house. Probably, if not equal to, a little
bit better than what we had.”
Each of these temporary living arrangements came with
its own set of challenges, and it was not unusual for par-
ticipants to have done all three. Residents who rented
apartments faced the financial burden of paying rent in
addition to the mortgage on their damaged home. Resi-
dents who stayed with family and friends described the
social stressors associated with that choice, especially as
these arrangements became longer-term. For some res-
idents, repairing their homes became the best option,
even believing that a buyout was imminent.
4.5. They Have No Options
One of the fundamental requirements of home buyout
programs in the U.S. is that they must be voluntary,
meaning that homeowners cannot be forced to partici-
pate. While policy safeguards are in place to protect resi-
dents from forced participation, the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary is less straightforward than it
may appear. Implementing agencies may attempt to in-
fluence participants’ decisions using policy tools such as
moratoria on construction, the condemnation of homes
deemed abandoned, or the use of the substantially dam-
aged declaration, where the cost of repairing a home
is determined to exceed 50% of the home’s predisaster
value. In cases where the substantially damaged decla-
ration is invoked, homeowners may be required to im-
plement costly mitigation measures, such as raising the
home above the base flood elevation if they wish to re-
build. For homeowners with limited financial means, the
implications of this policy are not dissimilar to that of
forced relocation. More subtle approaches may have a
similar effect, ranging from threats to reduce services
or not rebuild critical infrastructure to emphasizing the
threat of future hazards or the potential social and eco-
nomic impacts of rejecting a buyout when most of one’s
neighbors relocate (de Vries & Fraser, 2012). There are
a number of circumstances, then, under which buyout
programs that are technically voluntary may not be per-
ceived as such by residents.
In New York’s buyout, the experiences and percep-
tions of participants raised questions as to whether, or
to what degree, the program could truly be considered
voluntary. One participant stated clearly “People are be-
ing forced into leaving. They have no options.” While
language this direct was unusual, participants described
several more nuanced ways in which fears and conse-
quences (real and threatened) made the buyout feel like
less of a choice and more like their only real option.
Prior to Hurricane Sandy, residents of Oakwood
Beach valued the sense of safety their neighborhood
provided. The damage and destruction caused by Sandy,
however, violated this sense of safety. The structural mit-
2 Some participants did receive rental assistance from FEMA, though this process was described as difficult and stressful to the point that several partic-
ipants simply gave up trying to access it.
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igation measures that had been in place failed, including
a berm that separated the community from the ocean.
This led many residents to believe that nothing could
make the community safe from future hazards. This per-
ception was anchored by previous disaster experience
and perpetuated by buyout organizers and officials:
“So knowing that it was already compromised, one of
the biggest decisions to me was they’ll never get that
area back. Everything was totally destroyed, the flood
gate, the sea gate, the beach area, everything. It’s ba-
sically a flat area, so that was one of the biggest deci-
sions for us, that it would never, ever. Even a simple
storm at this point is a threat to that area.
Some I’m sure are not back yet in their homes, but it
doesn’t stop the fact that this will happen again and
some of us may not be that lucky again…please don’t
leave us here in danger there are children, handicap,
elders, just simple working people trying to be in a
safe place. Now even just a heavy rainfall can make
me very scared and my neighbors feel the same way.
Our lives have changed tremendously.”
In addition to fears about safety, participants described a
suite of potential consequences, including loss of choice,
for residents who rejected the buyout. While the use of
eminent domain is technically prohibited in buyouts, resi-
dents still feared that itwould be used to forcibly relocate
remaining households after the buyout, and that the pur-
chase price of the properties would be lower. For others,
the primary concern was that the housing market in Oak-
wood Beach would never recover after Sandy:
“Yeah, sowhen it goes into effect, and, you know, 80%
of the houses are gone, or something like that, there’s
nothing to stop the state from invoking, um, eminent
domain….So I think that’s the fear, or that’s the risk.
If everyone else takes it, and you don’t take it, you
know. That, you may be forced into a different sort of
arrangement. I have no idea if that would happen, I
have no idea if there’s a plan for that. But I think that’s
one of the dangers.
I do know a few of ‘em don’t wanna leave….But
they’re not thinking straight. Because if and when
they ever go to sell their house, because of the other
houses are gonna be knocked down and it’s all gonna
bebrought back to nature, everybody’s gonna remem-
ber exactly what happened. So you are never going to
get the money you could’ve gotten through this buy-
out. Because they’re giving us before flood prices. So
even if you fix your house up perfectly now, it’s not
worth what it was October 28. Just because of what
happened on October 29.”
Participants were also concerned that potential in-
creases in their flood insurance premiums would make
staying in their homes a financial impossibility. Fueled by
a national debate on the viability of the National Flood
Insurance Program and the passing of the controversial
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act in 2012, ru-
mors spread of insurance rate hikes in excess of $20,000
per year, an untenable amount for Oakwood Beach’s
working class households:
“I mean in all honesty, I would live in the house on
stilts if it was on the water. I love the water, but the
reality is, um, what kills us, is the flood insurance. You
know, because of course the bank’s not going to give
you more because you don’t have flood insurance,
and to get flood insurance, it’s just crazy what they
want to charge you for flood insurance because no
one wants to insure you. So that’s the dilemma and
the kind of stress that you deal with when you want
to live in a particular neighborhood or a beachfront
property. It creates a lot of stress in terms of the banks
and insurance companies and all that kind of stuff.”
While buyouts are voluntary by nature, then, our data
indicate that this, too, is an area of potential variation
across programs. The degree to which New York’s pro-
gram was truly voluntary was influenced not just by the
technical design of the program, but also the way in
which the buyout option was presented relative to other
options and by the broader recovery context.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have explored how key design compo-
nents of home buyout programs impact household ex-
periences and outcomes. In our case study of Oakwood
Beach, NewYork,we found that decisions about program
inclusion were originally based on familiar metrics, but
were ultimately limiting and perceived as arbitrary. Fi-
nancial incentives employed to encourage participation
were not just high, but possibly the highest on record.
At the same time, while they did appear to encourage
participation, these incentives did not necessarily relieve
the financial burden for buyout participants, whose pri-
mary concern was their ability to secure appropriate, de-
sirable, and equivalent new housing. The relatively low
level of government involvement was not necessarily a
distinguishing feature, though the program was shaped
by a history of mistrust of the government and com-
plicated by competing goals at the city and state lev-
els. While the buyout progressed relatively quickly, the
salient issue from the participants’ perspective was not
the pace of program implementation, but rather their
own progression through the buyout process and their
ability (or inability) to access coherent, accurate, and
timely information needed to make important decisions.
Lastly, a theme emerged related to the voluntary nature
of buyouts, an issue that has been previously raised in
the literature (de Vries & Fraser, 2012; Fraser, Elmore,
Godschalk, & Rohe, 2003). In keeping with findings from
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these studies, the buyout in NewYorkwas technically vol-
untary, though therewere gray areas in terms of how this
was perceived and experienced by participants. In the
New York buyout, then, individual program components
were tied to experiences and outcomes. This has implica-
tions for practice, as it suggests that even seemingly mi-
nor differences in program design may have significant
impacts on affected households and communities.
Whilewemaintain that the extant literature on home
buyout programs is too sparse to draw conclusions about
their viability or desirability as a disaster recovery tool,
our findings offer some suggestions as to how the expe-
rience of buyouts may be improved in cases where they
are implemented, or more speficially, how the experi-
ence of New York’s buyout might have been improved
for affected residents. We have previously drawn atten-
tion to the need for greater transparency at the imple-
menting agency level (Greer & Binder, 2016). In this case,
greater transparency may have reduced confusion and
frustration around the issues of program inclusion and
eligibilty for incentives, assuaged fears regarding future
uses for acquired properties, and enabled residents to
make more informed decisions throughout the process.
A clear, consistent, and accurate description of steps in-
volved in the buyout process, perhaps in the form of
an annotated timeline, would have allowed participants
to more accurately track their progress, understand the
process, and consider any avilable alternatives. In terms
of the lived experiences of affected residents, the in-
ability of the city and state to cooperate in develop-
ing and presenting recovery program options is inexcus-
able, and served to add confusion to an already diffi-
cult process. Given that the financial incentives provided,
while substantial when compared to previous programs,
were not adequate to meet participant needs, their ef-
fectiveness could have been increased through supports
that assisted participants in locating appropriate, afford-
able homes in their desired areas. Taken together these
changes, while simple, may have ameliorated a host of
participant concerns.
We must consider these findings in light of the fact
that, while New York’s buyout program reflected some
characteristics of previous programs, on the whole this
was a unique program in a long line of unique programs
(Greer & Binder, 2016). By comparison, Louisiana de-
signed a complicated buyout program after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that was characterized by a novel,
though arguably problemmatic, combination of finan-
cial disincentives and restrictions (Green & Olshansky,
2012). Studies suggest that this program, in addition to
being difficult for participants to understand and navi-
gate, hindered recovery and reinforced pre-existing eco-
nomic and social inequalities, especially in New Orleans
(Gotham, 2014;Green, Bates,& Smyth, 2007;Green&Ol-
shansky, 2012). In buyout programs, then, the devil may
be in the details. This signals a need to increase our un-
derstanding of the relationship between policy, design,
experience, and outcomes across a range of buyout pro-
grams, each of which are characterized by a range of pro-
gram components. This is an important step toward de-
veloping a more comprehensive theory of postdisaster
relocation, and in establishing an empirical foundation
for minimizing risk to buyout participants and informing
best practices in all phases of the buyout process.
We offer two specific recommendations for improv-
ing buyout policy and practice. First, given the broad
range of buyout programs, the variety of contexts in
which they are considered and implemented, and the
recent climate-induced relocations in the U.S. (Daven-
port & Robertson, 2016; Kennedy, 2016), there is a clear
need for an expanded research agenda in this area. Here,
we highlight two specific areas that warrant greater at-
tention. To expand our understanding of how program
design relates to experiences and outcomes, we recom-
mend that future studies examine the role of implement-
ing agencies. These agencies have received little atten-
tion in the literature (Kick, Fraser, Fulkerson, McKinney,
& de Vries, 2011), though they could contribute signif-
icantly to our understanding of how programs are con-
ceived, designed, and supported. More generally, the lit-
erature is silent on a primary, overarching question: are
people better off for having participated in home buyout
programs? Previous studies suggest that buyout partici-
pants may be subjected to a variety of risks, and without
empirical studies to document the potential benefits of
buyouts to the households that participate we cannot,
either at a policy or household level, give an informed
response to this question.
Second, in cases where buyouts are considered a vi-
able option, we cannot overstate the importance of in-
cluding local communities in the process. The true test
of home buyout programs is arguably their impact on af-
fected households and communities. Whether they are
considered successful or unsuccessful in any given con-
text, they are enormously disruptive. As such, we rec-
ommend that, at the local level, buyout programs be
community-led. While an exploration of the process of
community inclusion in buyouts is beyond the scope
of this paper, the limited literature on buyouts sug-
gests that community engagement in the buyout pro-
cess improves outcomes (Fraser, Doyle, & Young, 2006;
Knobloch, 2005), and participation in the planning pro-
cess is a consistent push of the larger recovery research
community (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Oliver-Smith,
1991; Smith, 2011). We recommend that implementing
agencies prioritize the inclusion of community perspec-
tives at all stages of the buyout process, including de-
termining where buyouts are (and are not) implemented
and developing viable alternativeswith communities and
households that reject buyouts. Relatedly, involving the
community in planning for recovery prior to a disaster
event may prevent post-disaster rebuilding that under-
mines the efficacy of hazard mitigation projects, includ-
ing relocations (FEMA, 2009). While examples of success
on this front are limited, previous studies have noted the
benefit of planning for post-disaster recovery and push
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all levels of government to spend the time to create these
plans (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Mileti & Passerini,
1996; Paul, Che, Stimers, & Dutt, 2007; Rubin, Saperstein,
& Barbee, 1985). In the case of buyouts, recovery plan-
ning presents an opportunity to identify high-risk areas,
begin a conversation with the community about buyouts
as a possible mitigation measure, and evaluate the po-
tential social, economic, and environmental impacts of a
buyout program, before a crisis occurs.
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